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In this article, I discuss the way in which descriptive material in
complex demonstratives contributes to their literal content relative
to the context of the utterance. A traditional hypothesis about
complex demonstratives in the philosophy of language postulates
that the descriptive material ‘F’ in ‘this/that F’ contributes to
literal content because an associated definite description
containing ‘F’ determines and expresses the literal content of the
complex demonstrative relative to a context. I claim that this kind
of hypothesis is mistaken because no type of definite description,
particularly Gödelian descriptions, plays a significant role in the
determination of the literal content of complex demonstratives.
Instead, I favor an approach according to which the literal content
of a complex demonstrative is mainly composed by the non-
quantificational content of the demonstrative expression (e.g.,
‘this’), and by the descriptive content of its nominal (‘F’). Complex
demonstratives are thus descriptive designators, that is, terms that
refer and describe without quantifying.
Keywords
Complex demonstratives; definite descriptions; description theory
of demonstratives; Gödelian theory; descriptive designators.
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Resumo
Neste artigo, discuto como o material descritivo dos demonstrativos
complexos contribuipara o seu conteúdo literal relativo a um
contexto de proferimento. Em filosofia da linguagem, uma hipótese
tradicional sobre os demonstrativos complexos prevê que o material
descritivo ‘F’ de um demonstrativo complexo faz uma
contribuição ao conteúdo literal porque uma descrição definida
contendo o nominal ‘F’ determina e expressa o conteúdo literal
do demonstrativo complexo relativo ao contexto de proferimento.
Assevero que este tipo de hipótese envolve erro porque nenhum
tipo de descrição definida, descrições Gödelianas em particular,
tem papel efetivo na determinação do conteúdo literal dos
demonstrativos complexos. Em vez disso, sou favorável a uma
abordagem segundo a qual o conteúdo literal de um demonstrativo
complexo é exaustivamente composto pelo conteúdo não-
quantificacional da expressão demonstrativa (e.g., ‘esta’) e pelo
conteúdo descritivo de seu nominal (e.g., ‘mesa’). Demonstrativos
complexos são, portanto, designadores descritivos, termos que se
referem e descrevem sem quantificar.
Palavras-chave
Demonstrativos complexos; descrições definidas; teoria descritivista
dos demonstrativos; teoria Gödeliana; designadores descritivos.
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1 Introduction
omplex demonstratives in English are expressions of the form ‘this F’
or ‘that F’, where ‘F’, the nominal of the demonstrative, is a common
noun possibly modified by other expressions such as adjectives,
prepositional phrases or restrictive relative clauses (e.g. ‘that woman’, ‘that tall
woman’, ‘that tall woman with glasses’, ‘that tall woman with glasses looking
in your direction’). Bare demonstratives contrast with complex demonstratives
by lacking a nominal. ‘This’ and ‘that’ are bare demonstratives in English.2
Much of the debate around the semantics of complex demonstratives has
centered on the issue of whether nominals make a semantic contribution. On the
assumption that they do, the question becomes what kind of contribution this
is. In the wake of influential work by David Kaplan (1989), this question has been
approached from two complementary perspectives: nominals may contribute to
reference determination and they may contribute to literal content.3  In the former
perspective, nominals constitute a condition of successful reference; if the
intended referent does not fit the nominal, it cannot be referred to by the complex
demonstrative token, relative to the context of utterance. In the latter perspective,
nominals constitute a condition of truth and falsity; if the referent does not fit the
nominal, the expressed literal content is false, if apt for truth.
Those who think that nominals contribute to reference determination
have only conquered important new ground in the past few years (v. SALMON,
2008; BRAUN, 2008). Yet, I still think that nominals contribute both to
reference determination and literal content. One very good reason is that this
hypothesis affords what appears to be the best explanation for the intuitive
validity of arguments like ‘if that violinist is a conductor \ some violinist is a
conductor’ (v. LEPORE; LUDWIG, 2000; cf. BORG, 2000).
Thus, my main concern in this essay lies not in whether nominals contribute
to the literal content of complex demonstratives, but rather in how they might do
this. A traditional way of understanding this contribution is via definite
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descriptions: ‘F’ contributes to the literal content of ‘that F’ because a definite
description containing ‘F’ determines and expresses the literal content of ‘that F’.
For example, ‘table’ contributes to the literal content of (a token of ) ‘that table’
relative to a particular context of utterance because the definite description ‘the
table there’ gives the literal content of ‘that table’ in that context.
I believe the contribution nominals make to the literal content of complex
demonstratives is independent of any definite descriptions speakers may come
to associate with them. And I think this because the literal content of complex
demonstratives is not determined by associated descriptions of any sort. In my
view, descriptions play no explanatory role in the literal content of complex
demonstratives, so on methodological grounds we are better off without them.
Yet, to try to show this, I will take an indirect route. In section 2, I will
summarize what I take to be the core constraints on all synonymy theories of
complex demonstratives, those theories that entail that complex demonstratives
are synonymous with definite descriptions. I will argue that only one such theory
meets all of these constraints, namely the ‘Gödelian theory’, put forth by Ernest
Lepore and Kirk Ludwig (2000) and Stephen Neale (2004, 2008b) (v. KING,
2001; cf. SOAMES, 2005).4  According to the Gödelian theory, ‘that F’ is
synonymous with a Gödelian description ‘the F identical to that’, where ‘that’
picks out the object the speaker intends to refer to in uttering ‘that F’ in the
context of the utterance. The upshot of this discussion will be that the Gödelian
theory is the best synonymy theory of complex demonstratives. In section 3, I will turn
to natural language syntax and ask the following question: on the hypothesis that
complex demonstratives are synonymous with Gödelian descriptions, what
syntax do they have? I will describe two strategies for an answer and urge that
syntactic theory in the Principles and Parameters framework does not force us to
choose either.5  The upshot of this discussion will be that we should cultivate a
positive disposition towards complex demonstratives being what they seem to be at face
value: non-quantificational terms that refer and describe. And, last, in section 4,
I will develop a methodological argument that shows that the literal content of
complex demonstratives is not determined by Gödelian descriptions. Since
Gödelian descriptions are the only ones in the running among description
theories, I will claim that the literal content of complex demonstratives is not
determined by definite descriptions of any sort. I will end with a brief outline of what
I believe complex demonstratives are from a semantic point of view.
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Thus, if I am right, explaining the contribution nominals make to the
literal content of complex demonstratives does not involve recourse to associated
descriptions. And this, coupled with the idea that definite descriptions are
natural language quantifers (NEALE, 1990), implies something important to
our understanding of natural language semantics: expressions in the singular
standardly used to refer may have descriptive content without being
quantificational. They are what I would call ‘descriptive designators’ (v. BURGE,
1974; RICHARD, 1993; DEVITT; STERELNY, 1999; DEVER, 2001;
DEVITT, 2004 for implementations of this sort of view).6
But before starting, three preliminary points are in order. First, I will
consider perceptual uses of complex demonstratives only, uses according to which
the speaker intends to refer to a particular object he or she has in mind, an object
that he or she perceives (and believes the audience to perceive) in the context
of the utterance. I think my main conclusions apply to other referential uses too,
but I am not going to argue for that point here.7
Second, I will not discuss uses of complex demonstratives in which the
speaker does not intend to refer to a particular object he or she has in mind,
exemplified by sentences like ‘those men who help others should be rewarded’ (v.
KING, 2001 for discussion of such uses). In what follows, my conclusions are
meant to apply to referential uses only. One good reason for this restriction in the
scope of my discussion is the promising idea that non-referential uses of complex
demonstratives should receive an independent, non-referential semantics.8 ,9
And, third, following Saul Kripke (1980) it is customary to distinguish two
types of description theory of a given term: a theory of ‘reference determination’
and a theory of ‘meaning’. In this essay, I will focus on the second kind – ‘synonymy
theories’, as I will call them. The main claims I will make apply to reference
determination theories as well, though I will not argue for that point here.
2. Synonymy Theories of Complex Demonstratives
In the philosophical literature of the past forty years, synonymy theories
of complex demonstratives have been assessed with respect to several dimensions,
including methodological, modal, epistemic, semantic, psychological, and
syntactic (v. e.g. BURGE, 1974; PERRY, 1977; SCHIFFER, 1981;
HIGGINBOTHAM, 1988; KAPLAN, 1989, NEALE, 1993; RICHARD, 1993;
BRAUN, 1994, SCHIFFER, 1995; BORG, 2000; LEPORE; LUDWIG, 2000;
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PERRY, 2001; KING, 2001; DEVER, 2001; SALMON, 2002; DEVITT,
2004; NEALE, 2004; SCHIFFER, 2005; NEALE, 2008a,b). In virtue of these
assessments and in light of independently achieved results on the semantics of
other terms, notably, proper names, incomplete definite descriptions, and
pronouns, a list of constraints on synonymy theories of complex demonstratives
is gradually coming into focus. The list I have in mind is not meant to be
exhaustive – for example, it leaves out syntactic constraints – although I think it
is fair to say that all, or at least most, of its members are necessary components of
an exhaustive future version.10  Here is the version I have in mind:
(1) A synonymy theory of complex demonstratives should be principled.
(2) The theory should not predict implausible ambiguities.
(3) It should not predict implausible indeterminacy.
(4) It should not predict implausible necessities.
(5) It should not predict implausible a priori knowledge.
(6) It should not predict implausible entailments.
(7) It should not ascribe implausible attitudes to speakers.
(8) It should not attribute implausible psychological associations to speakers.
In 2.1, I will briefly describe these constraints. In 2.2, I will assess
synonymy theories in their light.
2.1. The Constraints
Constraint 1: ‘Principled basis’ (DEVITT, 2004; cf. SCHIFFER, 1995).
Speakers often associate several definite descriptions with a complex demonstrative
token. For example, ‘that table’ in ‘that table is expensive’ as uttered by me in a
particular context may be associated with ‘the table over there’, ‘the table next to
June’, or ‘the table I intend to refer to now’. A synonymy theory of complex
demonstratives should explain why one associated description, rather than another,
is synonymous with the complex demonstrative.
Constraint 2: No implausible ambiguities (cf. SALMON, 2002; DEVITT,
2004). Our unreflective judgments about the literal content of complex
demonstratives suggest that if the nominal of a complex demonstrative is not
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ambiguous, the complex demonstrative as a whole is not ambiguous either.
Since we have no persuasive reasons to revise these judgments, a synonymy
theory should preserve them.
Constraint 3: No implausible indeterminacy (cf. WETTSTEIN, 1981;
SCHIFFER, 1995). Our unreflective judgments about the literal content of complex
demonstratives also suggest that if the nominal of a complex demonstrative does not
induce indeterminacy in literal content, the complex demonstrative as a whole is not
indeterminate in literal content. Since we have no persuasive reasons to revise these
judgments, a synonymy theory should preserve them.
Constraint 4: No implausible necessities (cf. KAPLAN, 1989, SOAMES,
2002). Our unreflective judgments about the literal content of sentences
containing complex demonstratives suggest that when f is not an essential
property of an object * and the content of f is not part of the content of the
nominal ‘F’, a declarative utterance of ‘that F is f ’ with the demonstrative used
to refer to * does not have a necessary reading (e.g. ‘that tomato is perceived by
me now’). Since we have no persuasive reasons to revise these modal judgments,
a synonymy theory should preserve them.
Constraint 5: No implausible a priori knowledge (cf. SOAMES, 2002). Our
unreflective judgments about the literal content of complex demonstratives also
suggest that when the content of f is not part of the content of the nominal ‘F’
and f is an empirical property, an utterance of ‘if that F exists, then that F is f ’
is not knowable a priori (e.g. ‘if that tomato exists, then that tomato is perceived
by me now).11  Since we have no persuasive reasons to revise these epistemic
judgments, a synonymy theory should preserve them.
Constraint 6: No implausible entailments (LEPORE; LUDWIG, 2000; cf.
KAPLAN, 1989; PERRY, 2001). A synonymy theory of complex demonstratives
should not predict implausible entailments from the literal content of complex
demonstrative utterances. For example, it should not predict that from the literal
content of an utterance of, say, ‘that tree is dead’ it semantically follows that the
speaker of the demonstrative exists.
Constraint 7: No implausible attitude ascriptions (NEALE, 2008b; cf.
SCHIFFER, 1995; SOAMES, 2002). A synonymy theory should not ascribe
implausible propositional attitudes to speakers. For example, it is perfectly
conceivable that someone in a counterfactual world believes the literal content
of my utterance of, say, ‘that river is polluted’ without harboring any attitude
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whatsoever with respect to me or the actual world (my actual world). A
synonymy theory should preserve these sorts of intuitions.12
Constraint 8: No implausible associations (PERRY, 1977; WILSON, 1991;
DEVITT, 2004; SCHIFFER, 2005). A synonymy theory should not attribute
associations between complex demonstratives and definite descriptions
competent speakers do not (or could not) make.
2.2. Synonymy Theories and the Constraints
Arguably, there are three main types of synonymy theory of complex
demonstratives: the mechanism theory, the locational theory, and the Gödelian
theory. In what follows, I will argue that in light of the constraints above the
Gödelian theory is the best of the three. Since these three are arguably the better
ones, the Gödelian theory is arguably the best one simpliciter.
2.2.1 The Mechanism Theory
According to the mechanism theory, a complex demonstrative ‘that F’ (or
‘this F’) is synonymous with a definite description whose nominal contains ‘F’
and a restriction on ‘F’ describing a mechanism of reference determination, a
complex of physical relations between speaker and referent necessary for the
determination of the latter. Let us call these definite descriptions ‘mechanism
descriptions’ (cf. DEVITT, 2004, p. 300; NEALE, 2008b, p. 314).
Hans Reichenbach (1947, p. 284-5) proposed a species of mechanism theory,
according to which ‘this F’ (or ‘that F’) is synonymous with ‘the F pointed to by a
gesture accompanying t’, where ‘t’ refers to the original complex demonstrative
token. Versions of the mechanism theory include: ‘this F’ (or ‘that F’) is synonymous
with ‘the F I am perceiving now’ (cf. SCHIFFER, 1981); ‘this F’ (or ‘that F’) is
synonymous with ‘the actual F I am demonstrating’ (cf. NEALE, 1993); ‘this F’ (or
‘that F’) is synonymous with ‘the F causing my demonstrative utterance’ (cf. LEWIS,
1984); ‘this F’ (or ‘that F’) is synonymous with ‘the actual F I intend to refer to now’.
For the purposes of the present discussion, I will assume that only one
type of mechanism description is synonymous with a complex demonstrative.
The main reason for this is that mechanism descriptions are best viewed as
representing the right sort of mechanism that helps determine the reference of
a complex demonstrative token. On the plausible assumption that there will be
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only one sort of mechanism that is right, one implementation of the theory will
be superior. I adopt a model for discussion: ‘that F’ (or ‘this F’) is synonymous
with ‘the actual F I perceive now’, where ‘I’ rigidly refers to the speaker and ‘now’
rigidly refers to the time of the utterance.13
An immediate challenge to the present theory, however, is associated with
constraint 6, according to which a synonymy theory should not predict
implausible entailments. Consider ‘that book has exactly 100 pages’ uttered by
me in a particular context (to refer to a particular book in my perceptual field).
According to the present theory, this utterance is synonymous with ‘the actual
book I perceive now has exactly 100 pages’ (uttered by me in the same context).
Yet, it is counterintuitive that from what I literally express it semantically
follows that I exist (LEPORE; LUDWIG, 2000, p. 210).14
Moreover, and confirming this point, it is perfectly conceivable that the
literal content of my original utterance is the object of a propositional attitude
by someone else in a counterfactual world independently of any attitudes
whatsoever this person may come to have with respect to me, the actual world
or perception (NEALE, 2008b, p. 315; cf. SOAMES, 2002, p. 43–50). The
mechanism theory would seem to predict otherwise, against constraint 7.
A further problem relates to constraint 8, which says that a synonymy
theory should not predict implausible associations. By ‘association’ here I mean
a three-place relation relating a speaker and two linguistic tokens such that a
speaker associates ‘that f ’ with ‘the y’ only if he or she forms a belief whose
content is <that f is the y> (cf. DEVITT, 1981).15  I call this sort of belief an ‘i-
belief ’ – short for ‘identification-belief ’. So, at the root of the present problem
is the idea that whenever a speaker utters ‘that F’ to refer to an F in mind, he
or she forms an i-belief whose content is <that F is the actual F I perceive now>.
I think such associations are at best dubious. For one thing, it is unclear
whether young children can always make them. The literature on first language
acquisition reports that young children start producing complex demonstratives
at around 2 to 3 years of age and many of these utterances are plausibly
construed as utterances to refer to a perceptually available object (v. e.g. CLARK,
2001). It would seem remarkable that, say, four-year-olds who are competent
with complex demonstratives even possess the concept of actual world (‘I and all
my surroundings’, ‘a maximally complete property of the universe’) expressed
by a rigidifier like ‘actual’ involved in the i-belief speakers should have when they
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utter a demonstrative token (on the present theory).16  Also, the concept of
perception is potentially problematic, for depending on the child’s age he or she
may very well lack any grasp of what perception is, and yet remain competent
with demonstratives all the same.
In addition, these associations are dubious for an ulterior reason: the
relation between speaker and referent necessary for the determination of the latter
will have to be a lot more sophisticated than what is suggested by mere ‘…
perceived by …’ (DEVITT; STERELNY, 1999, p. 61–2). This is so because the
mechanism theory must do duty to the idea that complex demonstratives typically
pick out the right F when the speaker perceives (or demonstrates or is caused by)
several Fs in the context of the utterance, and doing duty to this idea is likely to
involve mechanism descriptions that express very sophisticated concepts, concepts
of a scientific semantics probably. Yet, we have no good reason to expect that
speakers possess such concepts simply in virtue of their competence. Three or four-
year-olds exemplify the point very well. Should we expect them to have these
concepts? I doubt it. Such an expectation would seem to imply an implausible
paroxysm of the Piagetian idea that children are ‘little scientists’! In sum, it seems
too optimistic to think all competent speakers would even have the conceptual
resources to make the associations the mechanism theory predicts they make – let
alone actually make them in uttering complex demonstratives. For these reasons,
I believe the mechanism theory is untenable.
2.2.2. The Locational Theory
But, perhaps, synonymy theorists will take the following line: a complex
demonstrative ‘this F’ is synonymous with a definite description ‘the F here’,
and a complex demonstrative ‘that F’ is synonymous with a definite description
‘the F there’, where ‘here’ and ‘there’ refer to the location the intended referent
occupies in the context of the utterance (cf. QUINE, 1960; BERNSTEIN,
1997). Let us assume provisionally that ‘here’ rigidly refers to a location close
to the speaker and that ‘there’ rigidly refers to a location far from the speaker.
Let us call a description ‘the F here’ (or ‘the F there’) a ‘locational description’.
This sort of theory has plausibility. For one thing, it is a truism that
objects occupy some location or other. For another, the location an object
occupies is often used to identify it, for it is relatively costless from a cognitive
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perspective to invoke locations to elucidate an intended referent. For example,
as I order a muffin in a crowded coffee shop, the person behind the counter may
ask, ‘which muffin do you mean?’ to which I may reply, ‘that one, next to the
biscotti basket’.17
An initial problem with the locational theory, however, relates to the cross-
linguistic fact that demonstratives are not always used to express a relation of
distance between speaker and referent – even if we restrict ourselves to perceptual
uses. Thus, suppose I come close to a Matisse painting and utter, while looking
at it, ‘that painting is an amazing achievement’. This seems like a perfectly
felicitous use of ‘that painting’. In fact, depending on one’s views of Matisse’s
work, my utterance expresses a literal truth. Yet, if the locational theory is right,
the utterance may be infelicitous. After all, I may be too close to the painting.
Since there is nothing wrong with my utterance, even if I am very close to the
painting, there is something wrong with the theory – at least as stated.18
But there is a quick and effective patch for this problem: ‘this F’ (or ‘that
F’) is synonymous with ‘the F ere’, where ‘ere’ rigidly picks out a distance-
neutral location. This certainly accounts for the distance-neutral uses of
demonstratives, although arguably it is not nearly sufficient to ground the
locational theory.
One important reason is that the locational theory will often make wrong
truth conditional predictions. Consider the following scenario. There are two
copies of Reimer and Bezuidenhout’s Descriptions and Beyond in the room my
interlocutor and I occupy. One copy is on the only desk in the room. It is missing
page 541. The other copy is inside a drawer this desk has and it is not missing
page 541 (suppose my interlocutor and I are unaware of the second copy). The
drawer is closed, so the copy it contains is invisible. Suppose, furthermore, that
by chance the position of the invisible copy is perfectly symmetrical to the
position of the visible one; the invisible copy is exactly under the visible one,
the two separated only by the top of the desk. Now, consider my utterance of
‘this copy of Descriptions and Beyond is missing page 541’ as I look at the visible
copy and (presumably) intend to refer to it. Intuitively, this utterance is true
because that particular copy is missing page 541. Yet, the locational theory
would seem to predict otherwise. For, according to it the literal content of my
utterance is <the copy of Descriptions and Beyond ere is missing page 541>. On
the assumption that <the> is Russellian, my utterance would seem to be literally
AMARAL18
false. There are two copies of the book in the relevant location. This is a
significant drawback to the locational theory.19
Note that resort to a non-descriptive mechanism of reference
determination for ‘ere’ does not seem to help. First, ‘ere’ seems vaguer in content
than ‘this’ and ‘that’, from which it follows that scenarios like the one above are
not very hard to come across. Second, and worse, whichever non-descriptive
mechanism we may invoke to explain the reference of ‘ere’ is itself sufficient to
determine the reference of ‘that’ and ‘this’ taken on their own. This undercuts
the motivation for an analysis of ‘that F’ as ‘the F ere’ in the first place.
Moreover, the locational theory predicts implausible necessities and
implausible a priori knowledge (constraints 4 and 5). On the face of it, an
utterance of, say, ‘that desk is here’ does not seem to have a reading on which
it is necessary. And neither does it seem to be knowable a priori. But according
to (an unrigidified version of ) the locational theory it would; its literal content
would be <the desk ere is here>, where <ere> and <here> are the same location.
If we add a rigidifier to the locational description, we may avoid the
implausible necessity problem, but we face other ones. First, there is the
problem of implausible attitude ascriptions (constraint 7). It is perfectly
conceivable that a person in a counterfactual world believes the literal content
of my utterance of, say, ‘that desk is here’ without harboring any attitudes
whatsoever with respect to the actual world.
In addition, there is the problem of the theory’s attribution of implausible
associations (constraint 8). It is debatable that all speakers who are competent
with complex demonstratives associate rigidified locational descriptions when
they utter them. The main reason is that they would have to possess the concept
of actual world first, and it is unclear whether we should accept this. For these
reasons the locational theory does not appear to be very promising.20
2.2.3. The Gödelian Theory
Perhaps, then, one will propose the following alternative: a complex
demonstrative ‘that F’ (or ‘this F’) is synonymous with a definite description ‘the
F identical to that’, where ‘that’ is a rigidly-referring non-descriptive expression
referring to the object the speaker has in mind in uttering the complex
demonstrative (v. LEPORE; LUDWIG, 2000; NEALE, 2004; cf. KING,
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2001). I will follow Neale and call these definite descriptions ‘Gödelian’ and
the corresponding synonymy theory ‘the Gödelian theory’.21, 22
I think the Gödelian theory fares very well with respect to all of the eight
constraints described, and for this reason I think it is the best synonymy theory
of the four. In fact, I am convinced that it is the best synonymy theory of
complex demonstratives simpliciter.
First, the Gödelian theory does not predict implausible ambiguities. For,
complex demonstratives will be ambiguous insofar as their nominals are
ambiguous (constraint 2).
Second, the Gödelian theory does not predict implausible content
indeterminacy. For, complex demonstratives will have indeterminate content
insofar as their nominals induce content indeterminacy (constraint 3).
Third, the Gödelian theory does not predict implausible necessities
(constraint 4). For, ‘that F is identical to that’ – assuming both occurrences of
‘that’ are co-referential – has a reading on which it is necessary (cf. ‘that F is
identical to itself ’).
Fourth, the Gödelian theory does not predict implausible a priori
knowledge (constraint 5). For, the content of ‘if that F exists, then that F is
identical to that’ is as good a candidate for a priori knowledge as there is (cf. ‘if
that F exists, that F is identical to itself ’).
Fifth, the Gödelian theory does not predict implausible entailments
(constraint 6). It does predict, though, that from the literal content of an
utterance of, say, ‘that F is here’, we can infer ‘the F identical to that is here’,
but this does not seem to be a problem.
Sixth, the Gödelian theory does not encourage implausible attitude
ascriptions (constraint 7). For, it is very plausible that if someone in a
counterfactual world has an attitude with respect to the literal content of ‘that
F is G’ as uttered by me in the actual world this person thereby has the same
sort of attitude with respect to ‘the F identical to that is G’ uttered by me in
the original context.23
Seventh and last, the Gödelian theory does not seem to attribute
implausible associations to speakers. It does entail that in uttering ‘that F’ a
competent speaker thereby forms an i-belief whose content is <that F is the F
identical to that>. But this, for all we know, is a belief any competent speaker
forms in uttering ‘that F’.
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Not everyone would agree with this last remark, however. Emma Borg
(2003, p. 550) and Stephen Schiffer (2005, p. 1176), for example, have
independently suggested that it is dubious that competent speakers associate
Gödelian descriptions when they utter complex demonstratives. One way to
express their concern is by claiming that it is dubious whether speakers form i-
beliefs whose contents are <that F is the F identical to that> when speakers utter
complex demonstratives to refer to objects they have in mind. For ease of
exposition, let us call these i-beliefs ‘Gödelian i-beliefs’. Since the issue Borg and
Schiffer raise is important, and has not received much attention in the recent
literature, a digression is called for.
Arguably, there are two main paths to criticizing the Gödelian theory on
the grounds of implausible associations. One path – call it the concept possession
path – comprises the idea that (a subclass of ) competent speakers become
competent with complex demonstratives before acquiring the concepts
composing a Gödelian i-belief. A candidate class is very young children and a
potentially problematic concept here is token identity, expressed by ‘identical
to’ in a Gödelian description.
The other path – call it the concept application path – comprises the idea
that even though all speakers who are competent with complex demonstratives
possess the concepts composing a Gödelian i-belief they do not employ them
all when they utter demonstratives. A salient candidate for lack of employment
is once again the concept of token identity, and a salient class of speakers is very
young children.
As things stand, I believe both argumentative paths fail to show the
desired conclusion. Looking at the concept possession path first, it does carry
initial plausibility, however. For, one does wonder whether very young children
who are competent with complex demonstratives (e.g. 2 or 3-year-olds) possess
the concept of token identity.24
Interestingly, however, the work of developmental psychologists Elizabeth
Spelke, Susan Carey, and Fei Xu among others (v. e.g. XU, 1997) indicates that
this type of concern is probably exaggerated. In a series of illuminating
experiments, they provide strong evidence that infants as young as four months
old already can tell whether an object is the same as the one they perceived before.
And from there it is a very small step to the conclusion that these infants have
a grasp of token identity. Thus, when the infants reach their second and third
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birthdays and start uttering complex demonstratives to refer to an object in
mind, the concept of token identity is an old staple. The Gödelian theorist may
point to this evidence and claim that association with a Gödelian description
does not exclude young children from the class of speakers who are competent
with complex demonstratives.
Turning to the second path – the concept application path – the critic’s
goal is to show that even though all competent speakers possess all concepts
expressed by a Gödelian description, these speakers often fail to employ them all
when they utter complex demonstratives. If this were indeed shown, the Gödelian
theorist would have some explaining to do. But the problem is that it has not been
shown, pace Borg and Schiffer. And the core reason for this, it seems to me, is that
once we overcome our doubts with respect to concept possession, there does not
seem to be a reliable test left for determining that a speaker does not form a
Gödelian i-belief when he or she utters a complex demonstrative.
One proposed test involves asking the speaker what he or she means in
uttering a complex demonstrative (cf. SCHIFFER, 2005, p. 1176). But
problems arise almost immediately when we attempt to use this test. First, there
is the question of what to ask. Should the question be, ‘what do you mean to
express by your utterance of ‘that F’? Or should it be ‘by uttering ‘that F’ do
you mean to express ‘the F identical to that’? Or should it be something else
instead? Those who use this test will be asked for a principled basis. And a lack
of basis is potentially harmful because different types of questions may induce
different types of answers. It is plausible, for example, that if my subject is adult
and understands English and I ask, ‘by uttering ‘that F’ do you mean to express
‘the F identical to that’?’ pointing to the relevant thing, I will gather more
positive evidence (in favor of the Gödelian theory) than if I ask merely, ‘what
exactly do you mean to express by ‘that F’?’ The subject may be at a loss by the
latter question, or simply point to the intended referent, looking puzzled.
Moreover, speakers may be competent with complex demonstratives but
unable to articulate with precision what they mean in uttering them. Young
children provide examples. Would the questions above elicit relevant evidence
from, say, four-year olds? I doubt it, since they may not have the linguistic means
to articulate with precision what they mean (e.g. they might not have expressions
for identity relations in their vocabularies). Once we couple this problem with
the problem of the principled basis for formulating the questions in the first
place, asking the speaker what he or she means appears problematic. Since there
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does not seem to be an alternative test at our disposal, the Gödelian theory seems
to stand with respect to the threat of implausible associations.
In this way, we arrive at an appealing hypothesis for why the Gödelian
theory also meets the only remaining constraint on synonymy theories, namely
the principled basis constraint: meeting constraints 2-8 is the principled basis
for the choice of associated description. This dovetails very nicely with Neale’s
suggestion that Gödelian descriptions provide a ‘fool-proof ’ way of ‘regularly
interpreting utterances’ of complex demonstratives (2004, p. 171).
To conclude: the Gödelian theory comes out as the best synonymy theory
of the three. Since these three are arguably the better ones, the Gödelian theory
comes out as the best synonymy theory simpliciter. In this way, it provides an
empirically and intuitively sound account of how the nominal of a complex
demonstrative contributes to its literal content: it is part of a Gödelian
description that is synonymous with it.
3. A Syntactic Interlude: Descriptions in Disguise?
Yet, if complex demonstratives are Gödelian descriptions semantically,
and we assume that linguistic form constrains linguistic interpretation, it is
natural to wonder about the syntax of complex demonstratives. For, depending
on what we may discover about their syntax, we may have reason to reconsider
their semantics. So, what syntax do complex demonstratives have?
To start things off, I should say something about the syntactic framework
in which I will locate my discussion. It is the generative framework, and the
particular embodiment I will use is the Principles and Parameters model of syntax,
the classic P&P model (v. e.g. CHOMSKY, 1981, 1982, 1986). Within this
model, I will ask definite questions about the syntax of complex demonstratives
and attempt to assess the Gödelian theory from the vantage point of syntax.
Briefly, my argument in this section will consist in this. Assuming the
Gödelian theory in semantics, I will put forth two heuristic assumptions about the
syntax of complex demonstratives, ‘the naïve assumption about SS’ and ‘the
Gödelian assumption about LF’. I will suggest that holding them both generates
serious problems in syntax. I will then propose two strategies of revision, and
urge that if we aspire to a unified syntax for bare and complex demonstratives
both strategies of revision imply syntactic claims that turn out to be empirically
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disputable. The upshot of my discussion will be that syntax does not compel the
acceptance of the Gödelian theory in semantics. I will thus recommend that we
cultivate a positive disposition towards complex demonstratives being what they
seem to be at face value: non-quantificational terms that refer and describe.
The questions I am going to ask aim at elucidating how a complex
demonstrative sentence with the perceptible features it has can receive the
interpretation the Gödelian theory assigns it. In P&P syntax, answering this
question involves answering at least two other, more specific questions: ‘what is
the SS of a complex demonstrative sentence?’ and ‘what is the LF of this sentence?’ These
questions will guide my discussion in what follows.25
From a very high level of abstraction, let us assume heuristically, as a first
pass, that the SS of a sentence like ‘that woman sings well’ contains the following








where ‘IP’ stands for inflectional phrase, ‘VP’ for verb phrase, and ‘DP’ for
determiner phrase.26  Let us call this heuristic assumption ‘the naïve assumption
about SS’.
A striking feature of the naïve assumption about SS is the lack of a ‘null’
determiner in the subject DP.27  P&P theory teaches us about these entities, often
referred to as ‘empty categories’, syntactically real yet unpronounced and unwritten.
They are required for the proper explanation of a number of syntactic phenomena,
including the argument structure of certain infinitival clauses, structure preservation
of sentences after transformations, argument structure of subjectless clauses in certain
languages and more (V. HAEGEMAN, 1994, p. 433-79 for an introductory
presentation; cf. CHOMSKY, 1982, p. 17-36). The freedom from null determiners
implied by the naïve assumption about SS will serve us well in differentiating
strategies on the syntax of complex demonstratives below.
On the hypothesis that the Gödelian theory is true of complex demonstratives,
the complex demonstrative ‘that woman’ is synonymous with a Gödelian description
‘the woman identical to that’. Given that LF is the level of syntactic representation
interfacing syntax with semantics, it is sensible to ask whether the LF contribution of
‘that woman’ has the structural organization suggested by the Gödelian description
that gives its meaning. On the heuristic assumption that it does, the LF of our sample








identical to that]] [
VP
sings well] ]]
On the assumption that DPs undergo ‘raising’ from SS to LF,28  the LF
we are looking for will actually be somewhat different, but for our immediate
purposes we can overlook this. Let us assume, then, that something like LF0 is
the LF of ‘that woman sings well’. Let us call this heuristic assumption ‘the
Gödelian assumption about LF’.
We then run into the following (heuristic) question: how do we derive














identical to that]] [
VP
sings well]] ]29
For the question posed above to have full empirical content, we need to
determine XP at LF first. Since determining X involves being clear about several
other elements within LF0, I will leave this aside and attempt to proceed on the
present level of abstraction. Still, for the question to have empirical content at
all, we should make it clear that the demonstrative ‘that’ leaves a ‘trace’ after it
moves. Traces are essentially copies of moved elements, and they ensure that
syntactic structure is preserved after transformations occur. Thus, the presumed
derivation we should be assessing relates SS0 to LF0*, rather than SS0 to LF0,
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Given the salient discrepancy between SS0 and LF0*, three questions
arise:
(Q1) Where does the extra definite article at LF come from?
(Q2) Where does the extra XP at LF come from?
(Q3) Where does the identity relation within the XP at LF come from?
Let us refer to these questions collectively as ‘the discrepancy questions’
and to the sort of problem they convey ‘the discrepancy problem’.
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The discrepancy problem is not the only problem with an attempted
derivation from SS0 to LF0*. The demonstrative ‘that’ would have to move down
from SS to LF. Downward movement is generally disallowed in the P&P model,
the main reason for this being that the trace left by a moved element should be
‘c-commanded’ by it, a requirement downward movement disrespects.30
(Intuitively, the c-command requirement preserves the idea that a trace should
be within the scope of its antecedent). Let us call this problem ‘the downward
movement problem’.
So, the situation we seem to be facing is this: on the naïve assumption
about SS and on the Gödelian assumption about LF, two problems arise, the
discrepancy problem and the downward movement problem. The downward
movement problem blocks a derivation from SS0 to LF0*. The discrepancy
problem also calls for a solution, and there seems to be no easy way out. Thus,
some sort of revision is called for. The obvious candidates for revision are the naïve
assumption about SS and the Gödelian assumption about LF. Accordingly, two
strategies of revision come into focus.
On the first strategy, we give up the Gödelian assumption about LF but hold
fast to the naïve assumption about SS. We thus hypothesize that the LF of a complex
demonstrative sentence is syntactically similar to our naïve understanding of its SS.
In brief, we simplify LF. On the second strategy, we give up the naïve assumption
about SS and hold fast to the Gödelian assumption about LF. We thus hypothesize
that the SS of a complex demonstrative sentence is syntactically similar to our
Gödelian understanding of its LF. In brief, we embellish SS.
I will call the first strategy ‘the simplicity strategy’ and the second ‘the
universalist strategy’ (for reasons to become clear below). Each encompasses an
independent perspective on the syntax of complex demonstratives, consistent
with the Gödelian theory in semantics. I will discuss them separately.
Yet, before proceeding, a word of caution is called for. The syntactic claims
to be presented, associated with these two strategies of revision, are motivated
and justified on independent syntactic grounds – as attested by the literature on
generative syntax in the past decades. Intuitions about linguistic form in the
guise of the naïve assumption about SS and the Gödelian assumption about LF
play a heuristic role only in the argument of this section, the epistemic heavy lifting
being done by independent syntactic argumentation and evidence.
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3.1. The Simplicity Strategy
On a naïve understanding of the SSs of sentences containing complex
demonstratives, DPs hosting complex demonstratives contain no null determiners.
Thus, a natural specification of the SS contribution of complex demonstratives sees
the demonstrative morpheme as the determiner, the head of the DP, the D of the
DP. Indeed, this sort of view has been fairly standard in the syntax literature (v.
e.g. HAEGEMAN; GUERON, 1999, p. 59; ALEXIADOU et al., 2007, p. 93;
cf. POSTAL, 1966).
On the simplicity strategy, then, the simplified SS of a sentence like ‘that












Since one of our aims is to discover an LF that is syntactically compatible
with this SS, a natural candidate would have the following form, where the DP
is raised, leaving a co-indexed trace (‘t
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sings well] ] ]
From a very high level of abstraction, LF1 differs from SS1 only in having
the DP raised. Since this operation is motivated on independent syntactic
grounds, the derivation is overall unproblematic.
Yet, one may ask now what this syntactic result has to do with a Gödelian
semantics for complex demonstratives. For, by eliminating the Gödelian
assumption about LF, which finds Gödelian structure in the syntax, have not
we strayed too far from the spirit of the Gödelian theory?
The answer, I think, is ‘no’. For, on the present syntactic perspective,
demonstrative pronouns like ‘that’ and ‘this’ turn out to be determiners, the sort
of item from which the DP is projected.31  Now, articles are determiners par
excellence. Consequently, it is not wholly implausible to hypothesize that for all
syntactic ends and purposes demonstrative ‘pronouns’ are really a species of article
(v. POSTAL, 1966). This hypothesis would help to explain, for example, the
alleged fact that complex demonstratives cluster with definite descriptions on a
number of syntactic phenomena, including ‘Weak Crossover Effects’, ‘Antecedent
Contained Deletion’, and ‘Bach-Peters Sentences’ (v. KING, 2001; although for
criticism v. ALTSHULER, 2007). And it would also help to explain why definite
and indefinite articles in English do not co-occur with demonstratives. If they are
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different realizations of the same syntactic category, we have a straightforward
explanation.
Thus, ‘that’ and ‘this’ may be seen as Gödelian articles, definite and
indefinite articles receiving a Russellian account, Gödelian articles receiving a
Gödelian account (v. NEALE, 2004; cf. KING, 2001). This sort of view suggests
an improvement to our understanding of how complex demonstrative sentences,
with the perceptible features they have, receive the Gödelian interpretation they
purportedly receive.
Nonetheless, this picture of complex demonstrative syntax is not without
its problems. First, we need to explain how demonstratives, unlike definite and
indefinite articles, frequently occur bare in speech and writing, without any
nominal complement. This is true of English and of many other languages –
perhaps all languages. If ‘that’ and ‘this’ were a species of article, we should expect
them to always occur accompanied.
One way of handling this problem invokes so-called ‘intransitive’ DP-heads
(v. ABNEY, 1987, p. 266), in analogy with intransitive VP-heads (i.e. intransitive
verbs). On this view, an important syntactic difference between demonstratives
and the standard articles is that the former may be transitive/intransitive whereas
the latter are always transitive, always requiring a nominal complement.
Yet, there is something uncomfortable about this proposal even if we stop
calling demonstratives ‘articles’ for a moment. For, we will probably need two
lexical entries for demonstratives, one for the transitive form, the other for the
intransitive one; such entries would each specify how many and which sorts of
complements (if any) a demonstrative expression takes. This suggests that
demonstratives are syntactically ambiguous, a prima facie undesirable result.32
To avoid this potential problem, one may propose that demonstratives
like ‘that’ and ‘this’ always occur with a nominal complement (v. NEALE, 2004,
p. 118).33  It is just that when demonstratives occur bare their complements
remain unperceived. In other words, these complements are null.
But problems arise in this line of thought. For one thing, we should
specify the content of these allegedly null NP-complements. For, as Neale has
pointed out, what would be the point of an expression that is phonetically and
semantically empty? (NEALE, 2005, p. 232, n. 116). Perhaps, then, the
content of these alleged null NP-complements is something like <thing> or
<entity>? If so, ‘that’, when used demonstratively, would have the semantic
import of <that thing> or <that entity>. From this it would follow that a
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demonstrative utterance of ‘that is a thing’, if true, is a logical truth, on a par
with ‘that thing is a thing’, a counterintuitive result.
In response, one may point out that (i) intuitions may differ in these cases
and (ii) we need a clearer view of logical truth before we reach any serious
conclusion. Since these issues are complicated, one may suggest that the
hypothesis stands: bare demonstratives plausibly contain null NP-complements.
I accept the point for now, but will come back to it later, near the end of this
section.
Still, the idea that demonstratives are a species of article – hence, heads
of the DP – has been challenged on independent syntactic grounds. For, it has
been shown that despite the unacceptability of phrases containing article-
demonstrative combinations in English (and in other languages), their
counterparts in several other languages are perfectly acceptable (* indicates
unacceptability):
(a) *This the house
(b) *The house this
(c) *House the this
In Hungarian, Javanese, and Greek, for example, phrases of the form (a)
[demonstrative + article + common noun] are perfectly acceptable (v. ALEXIADOU,
HAEGEMAN e STAVROU, 2007, p. 110):
(a1) Ez    a      haz (Hungarian)
this  the  house
(a2) Ika   n      anak (Javanese)
this  the   baby
(a3) Afto   to   vivlio (Greek)
this    the   book
Also, Greek (v. ALEXIADOU et al., 2007; cf. NEALE, 2008a, p. 99),
Spanish (see Bruge, 1996), and arguably Ewondo (v. LYONS, 1999, p. 119)
accept phrases of the form (b) [article + common noun + demonstrative]:
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(b1) to   vivlio   afto (Greek)
the  book    this
(b2) el    libro  ese (Spanish)
the  book  this
And Romanian accepts phrases of the form (c) [common noun + (affixal)
article + demonstrative] (v. GIUSTI, 1997, p. 107–9):
(c1) baiatul   acesta       (Romanian)
boy-the   this
From the point of view of P&P syntax, the implications for the structure
of the DP in these languages seem clear. Since phrases cannot have two heads,
and the canonical position of the definite article is the head of the DP, the
demonstrative will have to sit somewhere else in the DP domain.
The question then is what this tells us about English. If we think that the
study of the basic structure of the DP is not mostly due to Universal Grammar
(UG), that different languages may differ radically with respect to their DPs,
the mentioned evidence does not say much about English. Undoubtedly, this
is a respectable theoretical stance.
Nonetheless, a growing number of linguists have been arguing for some
time now that this is not the right way to think about things. For, according to
them, it is methodologically preferable to work with the stronger hypothesis
that the DP is essentially the same in its elemental composition and hierarchical
organization in all languages (v. CINQUE, 2002, p. 3–4; cf. CHOMSKY,
1982, p. 16). And if we accept this hypothesis (sometimes referred to as ‘the
strong universality hypothesis’), the adduced evidence bears significantly on the
location of demonstratives in the English DP. By parity of position, it will be
hard for one to propose that they occupy the D position.34  This tips us in the
direction of the second strategy regarding the relationship between SS and LF
of sentences containing complex demonstratives, the universalist strategy.
3.2. The Universalist Strategy
On the universalist strategy, one takes very seriously the distribution of
articles and demonstratives in the above-mentioned (and other similar)
languages. This enterprise practically forces the rejection of the naïve assumption
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about SS. For, by parity of position, if demonstratives are not in D in these other
languages (because there is a definite article in D), they are not in D in English
either. Thus, when they occur accompanied by a common noun in English
something else will be in D. This something is plausibly a null article. And,
indeed, this sort of view has also received independent syntactic support in the
syntax literature (v. e.g. BRUGE, 1996; GIUSTI, 1997; cf. HAEGEMAN;
GUÉRON, 1999, p. 446–8).
Now, in the universalist strategy, something like the Gödelian assumption
about LF is preserved. This requires that a complex demonstrative like ‘that
woman’ be something like ‘the woman identical to that’ at LF. One promising
way of juxtaposing this requirement with the rejection of the naïve assumption
about SS is to locate the demonstrative in the left periphery of the DP at SS, a










































Two things call for immediate explanation. First, the ‘identical to’
locution, which figured previously in LF0, is absent from both SS2 and LF2.
One may find this objectionable, but insofar as the locution is motivated
primarily by a particular formal implementation of the Gödelian semantics, we
do not need to have a problem. Furthermore, the eradication of this locution
is attractive in that it obviates the question about its syntactic origin (Q3 above).
If this is right, all we need in order to capture the idea that ‘that woman’ is
syntactically ‘the woman identical to that’ is the combination ‘article +
demonstrative + common noun’ in the same DP domain (viz. ‘the woman that’).
This is precisely what SS2 and LF2 offer.
Second, at SS2 there is a trace within the DP (viz. ‘t
1
’), bound by the
maximal projection XP which hosts ‘that’. This means that the linear order we
find at SS2 is derived, the demonstrative being inserted lower, moving up to the
left periphery of the DP at SS.35  This hypothesis has received good empirical
support from cross-linguistic evidence (and is consistent with the word order
we find in English) (see BRUGE, 1996; ALEXIADOU et al., 2007). In fact,
it seems plausible if we aim at an explanation of the different word orders
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involving demonstratives and articles across different languages, for if we
postulate a single word order at the base with the demonstrative inserted low,
we can then explain the different word orders in terms of upward movement and
parametric variation.
Thus, the universalist strategy suggests an improvement to our
understanding of how complex demonstrative sentences, with the perceptible
features they have, can receive the Gödelian interpretation they purportedly receive.
Nevertheless, the present syntactic perspective is not without its
difficulties. The most important one is associated with the idea that ‘that’ and
‘this’ will be something like adjuncts, i.e. modifiers (cf. ‘the blue book’, ‘the that
book’, ‘the book of poems’, ‘the book that’). Thus, they will require an element
to modify, in this case a nominal element. But, as noted above, demonstratives
occur bare, without any nominal supplementation, in which case they do not
seem to modify anything. (Of course, one could always postulate a null NP
supplement, but it is very hard to find satisfactory empirical evidence for this.)36
Furthermore, inferences of the form ‘that F is G’ \ ‘that is G’ are valid.
If demonstratives were modifiers, what would they modify in the conclusion of
these inferences? One answer might be: a null NP, with the semantic import of
<thing>. So, the inference type would be ‘that the F is G’ \ ‘that the thing is
G’. But now we face a problem alluded to above, and a quite serious one in my
opinion: there is no syntactic evidence demonstrating the existence of null NPs in bare
demonstratives. From a syntactic point of view, bare demonstratives seem to be
perfectly autonomous items. Thus, we seem to be facing a significant empirical
problem on the universalist strategy.
It should be noted, incidentally, that both the simplicity and the
universalist strategies postulate a null NP in the syntax of bare demonstratives,
though the syntactic role this NP plays is different in each strategy. On the
simplicity strategy, the null NP must be a complement, required by the














universalist strategy, by contrast, the null NP need not be a complement;
instead, it may be an adjunct that modifies a null NP, itself a complement to









that]]. However, given the lack of syntactic evidence for null NPs in the syntax
of bare demonstratives, it is sensible to wonder whether we are on the right track.
Where should we go from here?
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I see three options: (i) endorse the simplicity strategy or the universalist
strategy and live with the cost of null NPs in the syntax of bare demonstratives,
a cost that can be partially settled theoretically; (ii) embrace a fundamental
syntactic ambiguity between bare and complex demonstratives; or (iii) seek
syntactic unification while preserving the insight that bare demonstratives are
autonomous nominal items.37
3.3. Referring and Describing
Even though (i) is the more popular view and (ii) also has followers (v.
e.g. DECHÁINE; WILTSCHKO, 2002), I think we might very well benefit
from the pursuit of (iii), according to which bare demonstratives are autonomous
NPs. If they occur accompanied, in ‘complex form’, they are still NPs but NPs
that combine with other NPs to form nominal complexes. Note that there is
nothing extraordinary about nominal complexes in natural language; plausible
candidates would include ‘we philosophers’, ‘you linguists’, ‘them kids’,
‘Princeton University’, ‘Carnegie Hall’ and arguably ‘I myself ’, ‘William of
Ockham’ and ‘Saul Aaron Kripke’. We need, of course, to explain the syntax of
nominal complexes (no trivial task). Since my purpose here is not to argue for
any particular syntactic proposal, I will have no theory to offer. But I do have
two suggestions to make, which seem to me to carry initial plausibility.38
First, we might consider the hypothesis that complex demonstratives are







man]]. This seems to make some sense of the similarities between complex
demonstratives, complex pronouns (e.g. ‘we philosophers’) and descriptive
names (e.g. ‘Carnegie Hall’) – and also of full names like ‘Saul Aaron Kripke’.
Second, we might consider the idea that complex demonstratives
instantiate a ‘relator phrase’ (RP) in the sense of Marcel den Dikken (2006).









man]], where ‘r’ is the head of the relator phrase (and may
remain unpronounced). Note that RPs not only have the ability to illuminate
the syntax of complex pronouns and descriptive names, but also throw light on
the syntax of small clauses, for example: ‘I consider this an interesting proposal’.
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Surely, a lot more needs to be said about both suggestions if we are to
accept them. Yet, in face of the empirical problem of null NPs in the syntax of
bare demonstratives, and motivated by the desire to unify the syntax of bare and
complex demonstratives, we may very well make progress pursuing these and
kindred alternatives.
In any event, the moral of the present discussion for the main theme of
this essay is merely this: P&P syntax does not force us to see complex demonstratives
as Gödelian descriptions. For one, we do not seem to be forced to adopt either the
simplicity or the universalist strategies in syntax. For another, even if we adopted
either, a Gödelian semantics would not follow from this. Thus, we should
cultivate a positive disposition towards complex demonstratives being what they
seem to be at face value: non-quantificational terms that refer and describe.
In the next section, I will offer a methodological argument that shows
that from a semantic point of view complex demonstratives probably are non-
quantificational terms that refer and describe.
4. The Domino Argument
I will start this section with what seems to me a rather plausible
observation: the literal content of bare demonstratives is probably not given by
associated descriptions. This negative claim includes two negative sub-claims:
(i) the literal content of a bare demonstrative is not given by an associated
description and (ii) the referent of a bare demonstrative is not determined by
an associated description.
Why think (i) and (ii)? First, because analyzing bare demonstratives in terms
of impoverished locational descriptions (viz. ‘the thing t/here’) would produce
unsatisfying results, since locational descriptions without a substantive nominal
would very often make wrong truth-conditional predictions. A simple utterance like
‘this is yours; take it’ is analyzed as ‘the thing here is yours; take it’, which is trivially
false, since an enormously large number of ‘things’ occupy any one location. Second,
analyzing bare demonstratives in terms of impoverished Gödelian descriptions (viz.
descriptions of the form ‘the thing identical to that’) would not work either, since
this proposal would appear to be ad hoc (NEALE, 1990; cf. NEALE, 2008).
Thus, the better option for a description theory of bare demonstratives
would probably be some version of the mechanism theory, which builds a
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mechanism of reference determination into the descriptive content of the bare
demonstrative. But then we run into a methodological problem, described by
Lepore and Ludwig in the following passage (v. DEVITT, 2004):
The description approach is a form of mimicry, piggybacking on an
independent means for securing a referent for predication as a way
of imitating the behavior of demonstratives. It attempts to treat
“that” as a quantifier by treating the means by which its referent is
determined, namely, by demonstration, as a general condition to be
met for singling out an object by way of a definite description. But
the fact that it must appeal to an independent means for securing
an object for predication shows that it is a counterfeit of the hard coin
of demonstration. The same work is being done twice over, but less
well the second time around. The act of demonstration itself secures
the object for predication. It would be pointless to go on to try to
secure it a second time by means of the matrix “x is demonstrated by
s at t”. (2000, p. 210-11)
If we understand ‘demonstration’ as any ‘act of referring’ – as Lepore and
Ludwig do – the passage applies equally well to any mechanism theory as
conceived in section 2.1.1. Since mechanism description theories are the only
description theories in the running for bare demonstratives, bare demonstratives
are not synonymous with descriptions, but very plausibly have their contents
determined non-descriptively, probably by the very mechanisms of reference
determination mechanism descriptions attempt to describe.
But then the Gödelian theory of complex demonstratives faces a similar
fate. For, given a non-descriptive semantics for bare demonstratives and the
contribution the nominal ‘F’ makes to the literal content of ‘that F’, it becomes
entirely unclear what distinctive semantic work Gödelian descriptions are
supposed to be doing. Modifying Lepore and Ludwig’s passage slightly, the
point can be made in their own words, mostly (modifications in italics):
The Gödelian description approach is a form of mimicry,
piggybacking on an independent means for securing a referent for
complex demonstratives as a way of imitating the behavior of complex
demonstratives. It attempts to treat “that F” as a quantifier by
treating the means by which its referent is determined, namely, by
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the application of F to the referent of “that”, as a general condition
to be met by way of a definite description. But the fact that it must
appeal to an independent means for reference determination shows
that it is a counterfeit of the hard coin. The same work is being
done twice over, but less well the second time around. The
application of F to the referent of “that” itself secures the referent of
“that F”. It would be pointless to go on to try to secure it a second
time by means of the matrix “x is identical to that”.
Since Gödelian descriptions are the only ones in the running for complex
demonstratives, complex demonstratives are probably not synonymous with
descriptions of any kind.
But what are complex demonstratives, if not disguised descriptions? As
suggested above, they are what they seem to be at face value: non-quantificational terms
that refer and describe: descriptive designators, I dub them. On this view, ‘that F’ refers
to * iff ‘that’ refers to * and * is F, and the literal content of ‘that F’ is something along
the lines of <*, F> (v. RICHARD, 1993; DEVER, 2001; cf. BURGE, 1974;
DEVITT; STERELNY, 1999; DEVITT, 2004 for analogous alternatives).
Note that the descriptive designator view adapts very well to the source
of the constraints on description theories discussed in section 2. For, it does not
entail ambiguities or content indeterminacy unless nominals trigger them.
Furthermore, it avoids implausible modal, epistemic, and psychological
consequences. And, it elucidates, in a theoretically satisfying way,39  how the
meaning of a complex demonstrative depends on the meanings of its parts. In
sum, the descriptive designator view appears to conserve what is right, and
dispense with what is wrong, with the Gödelian theory.
5. Concluding Remarks
In this essay, I argued for three main points: (i) that the Gödelian theory
is the best synonymy theory of complex demonstratives; (ii) that P&P syntax
does not force us to see complex demonstratives as synonymous with Gödelian
descriptions; and (iii) that on methodological grounds we should reject the
Gödelian theory and adopt the descriptive designator alternative.
At the outset, I framed my discussion in terms of the contribution the
nominal makes to the literal content of complex demonstratives, claiming that
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this contribution should not be understood via definite descriptions. One might
have thought that this choice of framing was somewhat unorthodox, since
arguably the main thrust of description theories of complex demonstratives was
never the nominal per se, which is given by the complex demonstrative itself, but
rather the something we know not what that helps to pick out the referent from
the available candidates satisfying the nominal in the context of the utterance.
To some, this amounts to the idea that description theories of complex
demonstratives are primarily theories of nominal restriction or nominal completion
rather than theories of nominal contribution per se.
In the face of the explanatory dispensability of associated descriptions to
the content of bare demonstratives, however, the only plausible explanatory role
left for associated descriptions to play with respect to the content of complex
demonstratives is that their nominals make a contribution. Hence the Gödelian
proposal, with its suspicious recourse to the idlest of all relations, the identity
relation. But we do not need associated descriptions to explain that the nominal
makes a contribution (pace NEALE, 2008: 308–13). Nominal application is
sufficient.40  Thus, Gödelian descriptions are dispensable posits, danglers in our
overall epistemic picture of demonstrative content.
So, to the question ‘are complex demonstratives synonymous with
descriptions?’ the answer (it seems to me) is ‘probably not’. And to the question,
‘are there terms in natural language that are both referential and descriptive
without being quantificational?’ the answer (it seems to me) is ‘probably yes’.
Complex demonstratives are among them.41
Notes
1 My thanks to Michael Devitt, Kent Bach, Stephen Neale, Jonathan Adler, Robert
Fiengo, Marcel den Dikken and an anonymous referee for Revista de Estudos da
Linguagem for helpful comments and suggestions on a previous version.
2 In this essay, I will not discuss demonstratives in the plural.
3 I understand literal content as equivalent to semantic content.
4 In my usage, and following Stephen Neale, ‘Gödelian descriptions’ are descriptions
of ‘the sort used in spelling out Gödel’s slingshot argument’ (NEALE, 2004, p. 171).
5 One may wonder at this point whether complex demonstratives and definite
descriptions, Gödelian descriptions in particular, could be synonymous. For, on the
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assumption that these expressions are different syntactically, they should be different
in meaning, one may suggest. In response, I should say three things. First, we need
to be clear on what constitutes a syntactic difference between two linguistic strings.
Second, we also need to be clear on what constitutes a meaning difference. And,
third, it seems very much open to question that syntactic differences entail meaning
differences. For, if this were true, syntax would appear to supervene on meaning, in
the sense that, necessarily, for any difference at the supervening level (syntax), there
would be a difference at the base level (meaning), in which case meaning would appear
to fix syntax. Since this result is unacceptable to many, I conclude that there is nothing
wrong with the working hypothesis that complex demonstratives and definite
descriptions are synonymous. I will reject this synonymy hypothesis later on, but
for reasons that are independent of the alleged autonomy of syntax vis-à-vis semantics.
6 Although the label ‘descriptive designator’ is new with me, the view itself is not.
Actually, there is a family of implementations of the same underlying idea in the
philosophical literature. Among the principal ones are those by Mark Richard (1993)
and Josh Dever (2001), on the one hand, and Tyler Burge (1974) and Michael Devitt
(2004) on the other. At present, I am inclined to join the Richard camp – due to
broad agreement with respect to foundational issues in semantics, issues ultimately
related to the nature of linguistic meaning and content. However, I will not commit
to any particular implementation of the view in this paper.
7 The other referential uses I have in mind are memory uses (e.g. ‘that lady last night
was a riot, wasn’t she?) and anaphoric uses with referential antecedents (e.g. here,
take this; this pill will help you with your cold). In my view – and departing from
Gareth Evans (1982) – perceptual, memory, and anaphoric uses are the three basic
types of referential use complex demonstratives have. I borrow the label ‘memory’
from Kent Bach’s illuminating discussion of singular thought. See his 1994.
8 Note that definite descriptions themselves also have this “dual nature”, as an
anonymous reviewer points out. In my view, it is eminently plausible to postulate a
referential/non-referential ambiguity in both complex demonstratives and definite
descriptions (see next footnote).
9 Jeffrey King has forcefully argued that a subclass of non-referential uses – the class
of what he calls ‘no demonstration no speaker reference’ uses (2001, p. 3) – constitutes
a serious challenge to a unified referential semantics for complex demonstratives. I
agree with King, but propose to face the challenge in the following way: complex
demonstratives – the linguistic types – are ambiguous between referential and non-
referential meanings. In my view, the proper sense of lexical ambiguity here is semantic
polysemy, the sort of ambiguity that comes about by the fossilization of communicative
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intention into coded content, the ambiguity that commonly carries over across
different languages (in sharp contrast to homonymies, which are typically
intralinguistic).
10 Devitt 2004 contains a similar list although its focus is incomplete definite
descriptions.
11 The intended contrast here is with logical or mathematical properties, which are
arguably a priori knowable. For example, the property of self-identity is a property
every individual whatsoever has. Arguably, this is a logical property.
12 An anonymous reviewer points out that in order to understand an utterance of
‘that river is polluted’ relative to a context, an interpreter in a counterfactual situation
might very well harbor some sort of attitude with respect to an utterer. As I see it,
the point in the passage regards the nature of the semantic content (or literal content)
of an utterance of ‘that river is polluted’ relative to a context (i.e. the proposition
semantically expressed relative to the context). This sort of content need not to involve
reference to utterers at all. Something more abstract, akin to Kaplanian character,
on the other hand, might involve reference to utterers (but, I emphasize, the point
here regards semantic or literal content).
13 The notion of rigidity I use is Kripkean (KRIPKE, 1980): ‘a’ rigidly refers to * iff
‘a’ refers to * in all possible worlds where * exists and ‘a’ does not refer to anything
in other worlds. Nathan Salmon (2005) has called this kind of rigidity ‘persistence’.
14 An anonymous reviewer complains about my reliance on intuitions here. As I see
it, and following many in the philosophical literature, an intuition about X is an
unreflective judgment or belief a speaker has about X. In this way, it would seem
very surprising that the literal (or semantic) content of an utterance of ‘that book has
exactly 100 pages’ relative to a context involves its utterer. On a very clear and
intuitive level, the content of the utterance is simply not about an utterer, but about
a particular book. I should also point out that, in stating this problem, I am making
an assumption (made by Lepore and Ludwig) according to which definite descriptions
are Russellian. Strawsonians will, of course, complain, but I do not see how an
endorsement of Strawson here would save the mechanism theory as a whole.
15 Throughout I use the convention of surrounding an expression with angled brackets
to refer to its (literal or semantic) content.
16 By this I mean that these children do not have the concepts required, not just the
linguistic means to express them. I believe it is unwarranted to attribute to children
at this age the possession of the concept of “actual world” as it is understood by
philosophers of language and modal logicians.
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17 One problem with the locational theory relates to other referential uses of complex
demonstratives, like memory and anaphoric. For, what role would a locational element
play in these cases? Since arguably there are sufficient and independent grounds to
reject the locational theory, overlooking this problem should not be a problem.
18 There are languages containing demonstratives that are always neutral with respect
to speaker/referent distance (v. LYONS, 1999, p. 112). French is an example; ‘ce’ is
itself neutral with respect to distance, although it may occur accompanied by the
morphemes ‘ci’ and ‘là’, which imply closeness and distance, respectively.
19 As an anonymous reviewer points out, I am assuming that the (actual) truth-
conditions of the proposition literally (or semantically) expressed by the original
utterance of ‘this copy of Descriptions and Beyond is missing page 541’ are constituted
by the “real world as it is” – as opposed to a “real world as represented by speaker and
hearer in the context of the utterance”.
20 One may propose an alternative synonymy theory, which may be called ‘the
situational theory’: ‘that F’ (or ‘this F’) is synonymous with ‘the F in s’, where s is a
situation containing the right F. The main problem with this theory is that being a
member of a situation (or in a situation, as one may prefer to put it) probably plays
no distinctive semantic work when it comes to deictic referential complex
demonstratives. For, whichever mechanisms of individuation of situations we invoke
would appear to be themselves sufficient to determine the reference of ‘that’ in ‘that
F’. Reference to situations would thus be superfluous.
21 Actually, Neale (2004; 2008b) claims that complex demonstratives are equivalent
to indefinite Gödelian descriptions. I will not pursue these differences here.
22 An alternative name for this sort of theory might be ‘the haecceity theory’, according
to which a complex demonstrative is synonymous with a haecceity description, a definite
description that denotes a particular object via its haecceity. As I construe it, a haecceity
is the property an object a has of being identical to itself (viz. lx (x=a)). Compare Robert
Adams’s use of ‘thisness’: “a thisness is the property of being identical with a certain
particular individual – not the property that we all share, of being identical with some
individual or other, but my property of being identical with me, your property of being
identical with you, etc.” (1979, p. 6). One reason I stick with ‘Gödelian theory’ and
‘Gödelian description’ is that I am not certain that I should graft the Gödelian approach
onto the hypothesis that English ‘that’ is a (pronominal) predicate.
23 This point may be disputed, since we can conceive of worlds where speakers
(competent with demonstratives) simply lack the concept of token identity. There is
the question, of course, of how far these worlds are from us, and hence how relevant
to our practices they are. I will not pursue this here.
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24 Another potentially problematic concept here is the concept expressed by ‘the’. If
it is Russellian, competence with demonstratives may very well involve a grasp of
the concept of totality.
25 One may suggest that this discussion should be couched in Minimalist terms, as
opposed to the classic GB P&P terminology, which is arguably ‘outdated’. I favor
classic P&P because talk of optimal design of the language faculty seems very much
open to question and classic P&P seems largely adequate empirically.
26 I assume the DP-hypothesis without discussion (v. e.g. ABNEY, 1987), although
close to the end of this section it will become clear that this assumption is unnecessary.
27 This particular SS representation is highly idealized. In P&P syntax, SS is a level
of representation where all sorts of null elements reside. For example, under the so-
called ‘VP-internal subject hypothesis’, subjects are born VP-internally at DS, moving
up to Spec, IP at SS, leaving a co-indexed trace in their original VP positions. I
bypass such considerations to achieve a simpler exposition. For much the same
reasons, I bypass talk of an agreement layer between DP and NP. None of this should
detract from the main points I intend to make.
28 On the assumption made by Gödelian theorists that ‘the F’ is a type of natural
language quantifier, the kind of raising alluded to here is QR, quantifier raising,
which maps SS to LF representations by ‘Chomsky-adjunction’ (cf. MAY, 1985;
NEALE, 1994).
29 Even though this way of putting things may seem odd to syntacticians, it should
be emphasized that the derivations are not supposed to be completely realistic. They
are mainly heuristic.
30 A node X c-commands a node Y iff the first branching node dominating X dominates
Y (and neither dominates the other). See e.g. HAEGEMAN, 1994, p. 134.
31 There appears to be an equivocation in the use of ‘determiner’ in the philosophical
literature. Some use it to refer to an item that ‘combines with nominals to form
complex noun phrases’ (v. e.g. LEPORE; LUDWIG, 2000, p. 203) while others use
it to refer to a certain position in the DP, the head position of the DP. In this essay,
I always use the term in this second sense.
32 Furthermore, there would be little point in calling such intransitive determiners
‘determiners’ since nothing syntactic would appear to compel us to see them as
determiners. Why not call them ‘NPs’ instead?
33 Definite articles do at times occur without complements, but the explanation for this
phenomenon is presumably ‘syntactic deletion’. Portuguese exemplifies this: ‘o carro do
João é mais rápido do que o […] da Maria’, where the bold italicized ‘o’ is the (masculine
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singular) definite article without a complement – the brackets indicate where the
complement would go. In English, this example would be (literally) ‘the car of John is
faster than the […] of Maria’ which would be better expressed by ‘John’s car is faster
than Maria’s […]’, where the nominal ‘car’ is deleted from the constituent ‘Maria’s’. These
cases of deletion, however, seem independent of whether or not bare demonstratives
always have null NP-complements. Cf. LASNIK; SAITO, 1992, p. 161.
34 Which is not to say, of course, that we are rationally forced to leave the simplicity
strategy. Nevertheless, we do not seem compelled to accept it either, which opens
the way for alternative (and perhaps more plausible) analyses.
35 It should be pointed out that the common noun itself arguably occupies a derived
position at SS, being inserted lower and then moving up closer to the article. I will
leave this complication aside (v. BRUGE, 1996 for further discussion).
36 Actually, things are more complicated than this suggests. There are at least five
different ways in which we can understand demonstratives within the universalist
strategy: demonstratives are (a) adjuncts, maximal projections that are sisters to N’,
dominated by NP, itself sister to D; (b) demonstratives are adjective heads, immediately
dominated by AP, itself sister to D; (c) demonstratives are specifiers of a dedicated
functional phrase between DP and NP; (d) demonstratives are elements of a relative
clause (CP) adjoined to DP (cf. the blue car; the car which is blue; the that car; the
car which is that); (e) the demonstrative ‘that’ is always a complementizer. All of
these options have one thing in common, however, which is crucial to the present
discussion: they require null NP supplements when demonstratives occur bare. This
justifies the simplification in the body of the text.
37 There are at least three ways in which we can understand the syntactic autonomy
of bare demonstratives: (i) they require no complements (unlike articles); (ii) they
require nothing to modify (unlike adjuncts/adjectives); (iii) they are DP-external.
Irish is arguably a language in which demonstratives are DP-external (v. LYONS,
1999, p. 120).
38 This sort of proposal is consistent with the DP-hypothesis though it does not require it.
39 An anonymous reviewer points out that, on the descriptive designator view, distality
differences between ‘this’ and ‘that’ remain unaccounted for. This need not be so,
since there are at least two approaches available to the descriptive designator theorist:
(i) deny that there is any true semantic difference, locating in pragmatics the presumed
difference; (ii) explain the differences on a more abstract semantic level, something
akin to Kaplanian character (in contrast to semantic or literal content).
40 Nominal application is meant to be a relationship between a predicate (or
predicative expression) and an object or entity. A predicate applies to an object iff
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the object exemplifies the property described by the predicate. In this way, ‘that F’
refers to * iff ‘that’ refers to * and ‘F’ applies to * – in other words, iff * is the referent
of ‘that’ and is F.
41 Examples include descriptive names (e.g. ‘Carnegie Hall’), complex pronouns (e.g.
‘you oboists’), and (semantically) referential descriptions (e.g. ‘the concert last night’).
After all, why should describing with a term always imply quantifying?
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